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1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom suggests that taxation of intended bequests gives rise to a typical
equity-e¢ciency trade-o¤.1 Whereas advocates emphasize the role of bequest taxation
for redistributing wealth, opponents highlight potentially adverse e¤ects on wealth
accumulation. (See Gale and Slemrod, 2001, for a review of the debate, and an extensive
discussion of estate taxation in the United States.) Especially in the United States, the
debate on estate taxation has become ideologically charged. McCa¤ery (1999) equates
estate taxation with grave robbery. A key element of the Bush tax reform was phasing
out estate taxation by 2010, on the ground of its claimed detrimental e¤ects on hard
work, entrepreneurship, and capital accumulation (see Beach, 2003). On the other side
of the debate, over 2,000 American millionaires or billionaires, including William H.
Gates Sr. (the father of Bill Gates), George Soros, several members of the Rockefeller
family and Ted Turner, have signed a petition to reform but not abolish estate tax. In
their view, estate tax is not only the most progressive tax in the United States and an
important source of revenue, but also an incentive to charitable giving.
This paper, by contrast, shows that taxation of intended bequests can be justi…ed
for pure e¢ciency reasons. We develop a three-period overlapping-generations model in
which altruistic parents face a trade-o¤ between investing in their children’s education
and leaving bequests. We start from a second-best world in which wage taxation
distorts human capital investment. We show that, even if the wage tax rate is held
constant, introducing a bequest tax can be Pareto-improving by enhancing incentives
of parents to invest in their children’s education.
More precisely, our analysis suggests that a positive bequest tax is called for on
pure e¢ciency grounds when the positive e¤ect of bequest taxation on human capital
formation is su¢ciently high to outweigh the negative e¤ects from reduced wealth ac-
cumulation. It is generally not only optimal in the sense that it maximizes an objective
1In contrast, taxation of accidental bequests is usually thought of having lump-sum character. See,
however, Blumkin and Sadka (2003) for an important modi…cation of this result. They show that the
optimal tax on accidental bequests is typically below 100 percent when labor supply is endogenous
and there is wage taxation. In this paper, we exclusively focus on intended bequests.
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function of a social planner, but even improves utility of all currently living and fu-
ture generations. We also provide numerical results on the optimal tax structure which
demonstrate that the relative weight between a linear tax on bequests and wage income
depends positively on the extent of the distortion a wage tax causes on educational
investments. The results also suggest that the wage tax rate should be considerably
higher than the bequest tax rate, but the latter is generally positive when the required
government revenue in the economy is su¢ciently high.
Our results markedly di¤er from those in the previous literature in which the inter-
action between bequest and labor income taxation has been analyzed without consider-
ing the decision of parents how to allocate resources to children between education and
wealth transfer. Previous literature suggests that the case for taxing bequests is rather
weak.2 For instance, a strong case against bequest taxation comes from in…nite-horizon,
Ramsey-type models. As it is well-known (see e.g. Cremer and Pestieau, 2003), this
kind of framework can be interpreted as a model of individuals with a Barro-type form
of altruism (Barro, 1974) who live one period, so that bequest taxation coincides with
capital taxation. Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) show that with an in…nite-horizon,
the disincentives to accumulate capital and the implied e¤ects on the consumption
stream are so strong that the optimal capital tax converges to zero, despite potential
bene…ts from redistribution across heterogeneous agents. The Chamley-Judd result of
zero capital income taxation in the limit has been quali…ed by extending the neoclassi-
cal growth model to imperfect goods market competition (Judd, 2002), unemployment
as a result of search frictions in the labor market (Domeij, 2005) and, most interestingly
in light of our contribution, human capital formation (Jones et al., 1993, 1997).3 Our
paper di¤ers from these contributions in two important respects. First, while these
contributions analyze a standard Ramsey problem in which the government has an
2For an excellent survey of the existing literature on optimal bequest taxation under various motives
to leave …nancial bequests, see Cremer and Pestiau (2003).
3Judd (2002) suggests that the capital income tax should be negative if there is imperfect compe-
tition, whereas Domeij (2005) shows that whether it should be positive or negative depends on the
tightness of the labor market. Jones et al. (1993) show that the optimal long-run tax on capital
income is positive in an endogenous growth framework where government spending is productive.
Jones et al. (1997) argue that the Chamley-Judd result also fails to hold when there are pure rents,
or di¤erent types of labor which need to be taxed at the same rate.
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intertemporal budget constraint, we analyze the optimality of bequest taxes in case
the government budget constraint has to be satis…ed in each period. Such a restriction
would not be optimal if the government is run by a benevolent social planner with
an in…nite lifespan. Our analysis complements the results derived by the traditional
optimal tax literature if such a planner does not exist, and future generations could
consume more than their intended share of the funds that the planner would have
intended to last in…nitely.4 Second, the results in the Chamley-Judd tradition have
been restricted to capital income taxation or, if re-interpreted as bequest taxation, to
Barrovian dynasties. We analyze bequest taxation with non-Barrovian dynasties when
parents derive utility from children receiving resources.
In …nite horizon models, a potential desirability of a positive bequest tax in the
existing literature typically derives from the possibility of accidental bequests (Blumkin
and Sadka, 2003), redistribution e¤ects in heterogeneous agent models (e.g. Cremer
and Pestieau, 2001)5 or, as pointed out by Kopczuk (2001), from negative externalities
arising from wealth inequality.6 By focusing on a steady state, an optimal mix between
wage taxation and bequest taxation has recently been analyzed also by Michel and
Pestieau (2004) who assume a “joy of giving”bequest motive. They show that bequest
taxes should typically be negative when the social planner takes into account this
bequest motive. Our paper di¤ers from these contributions by allowing parents to
4If the results that Chamley, Judd and Jones et al. (1993, 1997) derive in an in…nitely-lived agent
framework would be extrapolated to a world of overlapping generations, their …ndings would suggest
as an optimal tax policy to levy potentially high taxes during several generations to accumulate funds
that would …nally generate enough interest to allow future governments to pay for expenditures.
However, such funds could tempt generations alive in any given period in future to spend at least part
of assets, rather than just the interest that a social planner alive several generations ago intended
them to receive. Furthermore, it is not evident that current generations would be willing to sacri…ce
their utility to accumulate assets that would be used to improve the standards of living after several
generations.
5Cremer and Pestieau (2001) analyze the optimal tax schedule when parents have two children
with di¤erent abilities, but ability is unobservable for the tax authority.
6As some authors point out, in principle, estate taxation can have even adverse e¤ects on equality
(e.g. Becker, 1974; Tomes, 1981). This may arise when transfers are used by parents to o¤set
inequalities within a family. In this case, estate taxation may mitigate the redistributive e¤ect of
wealth transfers which may occur within families. Empirical evidence, however, seems to refute the
hypothesis that siblings with lower incomes receive larger inheritances (e.g., Wilhelm, 1996). Kleiber
et al. (2005) show in an overlapping-generations model where the level of bequest enters parent’s
utility that redistributive bequest taxation is an e¤ective tool to decrease wealth inequality.
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transfer resources to their children also through education, while the existing literature
on bequest taxation with …nite horizons assumes that bequests are the only form of
intergenerational transfers.
Finally, Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005) analyze optimal linear taxes on capital and
labor income with human capital investment and …nancial savings. They …nd that the
positive tax on capital income serves to alleviate distortions arising from labor income
taxation. This is in some sense similar to our result on bequest taxation; however,
our paper di¤ers in two crucial respects. First, we analyze an in…nitely lasting OLG
economy while Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005) assume that the economy lasts only for
three periods. The positive capital income taxes that Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005)
derive are in line with Jones et al. (1993) who show that even if optimal capital income
taxes would converge to zero also in the presence of human capital formation, they are
typically positive within a …nite time. Instead, we identify conditions under which
bequest taxes are positive also in the steady-state. Second, Jacobs and Bovenberg
(2005) do not consider intergenerational transfers or altruism, which is the focus of
this paper.
In sum, it is fair to conclude that none of the previous contributions examines the
welfare e¤ects of bequest taxation with …nite lives when parents can invest in their
children’s education.7
In the coming section, we present the basic structure of the model. In section 3, we
analyze the equilibrium, particularly focusing on the question under which conditions
bequest taxation leads to a Pareto-improvement. Section 4 provides numerical illus-
trations on the optimal (linear) tax structure. The last section concludes. All proofs
are relegated to an appendix.
7We are by far not the …rst ones, however, to analyze the interplay between bequests and in-
vestment in education by parents. Blinder (1976) studies intergenerational transfers and life cycle
consumption and remarks that di¤erential tax treatment of intergenerational transfers of human cap-
ital and bequests should have consequences on the mix of the two. However, he does not provide a
formal analysis. Ishikawa (1975) analyzes household decisions concerning education and bequests in
the absence of taxation.
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2 The Model
2.1 Production of Final Output
In every period, a single homogeneous consumption good is produced according to a
neoclassical, constant-returns-to-scale production technology. Output at time t, Yt, is
Yt = F (Kt; Ht) ´ Htf(kt); kt ´ Kt=Ht; (1)
where Kt and Ht are the amounts of physical capital and human capital employed in
period t, respectively, the latter being measured in e¢ciency units. f(¢) is a strictly
monotonicly increasing and strictly concave function which ful…lls lim
k!1
f 0(k) = 0 and
lim
k!0+
f 0(k) = 1.8
Output is sold to a perfectly competitive world market, with output price nor-
malized to unity. The rate of return to capital, rt, is internationally given and time-
invariant, i.e., rt = ¹r. That is, we analyze a small open economy framework with
perfectly mobile capital.9
Pro…t maximization of the representative …rm in any period t implies that ¹r =
f 0(kt). Thus, kt = (f 0)¡1(¹r) ´ ¹k. The wage rate per e¢ciency unit of human capital,
wt, reads wt = f(¹k)¡ ¹kf 0(¹k) ´ ¹w and output is given by Yt = Htf(¹k).
2.2 Individuals and Education Technology
In each period t, a unit mass of identical individuals (generation t) is born. An individ-
ual lives three periods. In the …rst period (childhood), individuals live by their parents
8The capital-skill complementarity underlying production function (1) is empirically well sup-
ported; see e.g. Goldin and Katz (1998).
9In a closed economy or a large open economy, changes in bequest taxes would also change the
interest rate, through their e¤ects on aggregate savings. Such induced e¤ects are, however, likely
only of second-order importance. Moreover, the small open economy assumption allows our results
to be applicable to the state level in the United States, as well as to the European countries. Even
though most of the debate on bequest taxation in the United States has concerned federal estate
taxes, the issue is important at the state level as well. U.S. states di¤er widely in their estate taxes.
The U.S. federal estate tax has allowed a dollar-for-dollar credit for state inheritance taxes, e¤ectively
encouraging states to collect taxes at least at the same rate as the federal government (Minnesota
House of Representatives Research Department, 2004).
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and acquire education. In the second period (working age), individuals supply their
human capital to the labor market, give birth to one child, invest in their children’s
human capital,10 and save for old age. In their …nal period of life (retirement age),
they allocate their income between consumption and transfers to their o¤spring, from
now on labeled “bequests”. For simplicity, suppose that the …nancial market is perfect
and there is no human capital risk.
An individual born in period t (a member of generation t) with parental investment
et (in units of the consumption good) in education acquires
ht+1 = h(et); (2)
units of human capital in t + 1, where h(¢) is a strictly monotonicly increasing and
strictly concave function which ful…lls lim
e!1
h0(e) = 0 and lim
e!0+
h0(e) = 1.11 As in-
dividuals are identical and of unit mass, the aggregate human capital stock is given
by Ht+1 = ht+1. Let st+1 denote the amount of savings of a member of generation t
for retirement. Initially, at t = 1, both savings of the currently old generation (born
in t = ¡1), s0, and the education level of the current middle-aged generation (born at
t = 0), e0, are given. (Hence, the initial stock of human capital, H1 = h(e0) is given.)
Utility Ut of a member of generation t is de…ned over consumption levels c2;t+1
and c3;t+2 in the working and retirement age, respectively, and disposable income of
the o¤spring (born in t+ 1) in its working age, It+2.12 Assuming additively separable
utility, we have
Ut = u2(c2;t+1) + ¯V (c3;t+2; It+2); (3)
V (c3;t+2; It+2) = u3(c3;t+2) + v(It+2); (4)
10Human capital investments can be thought of as both nonschooling forms of training and private
schooling.
11For a similar speci…cation and a discussion of diminishing returns to human capital investment,
see e.g. Galor and Moav (2004), among others.
12At the cost of some notational complexity, we could introduce either an exogenous consumption
for children, or assume that the utility function of the middle-aged parents would have the family
consumption as its argument, this being optimally allocated between the parent and the child.
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where u2(¢), u3(¢) and v(¢) are strictly monotonic increasing and strictly concave func-
tions, and ¯ 2 (0; 1) is a discount factor. The altruism motive re‡ects the notion that
parents care about the economic situation of their o¤spring. It may be called “joy-
of-children-receiving-income”, in contrast to the often assumed “joy-of-giving”motive,
in which the bequeathed amount of resources enters utility.13 Assuming the former
rather than the latter seems more plausible in the present context, in which parents
also …nance the human capital investment of children. By contrast, joy of giving with
respect to education …nance would imply that parents value education per se, rather
than as a means to earn income. Our “joy-of-children-receiving-income”motivation
is linked to Gradstein and Justman (1997), who assume that parents care about the
earnings capacity of children. However, in their model gross rather than net income of
children enters parents’utility and parents do not leave …nancial bequests. Moreover,
our bequest motive is related to Blinder (1976) and Carroll (2000), who assume that
the after-tax bequest enters parents’utility function.
2.3 Public Sector
The government has to …nance an exogenous expenditure ¹G ¸ 0 in each period. In
the Chamley-Judd framework, the problem of the government is to choose an optimal
intertemporal pro…le of wage taxes and bequest taxes to …nance its expenditures over
time. While acknowledging the importance of this traditional approach, we adopt a
more challenging criterion of intertemporal Pareto-optimality. There are two reasons
for this.
From normative perspective, we view the Chamley-Judd framework as fully ap-
propriate for their analysis of in…nitely-lived households, but more problematic in an
overlapping generations environment. Judd (1985, 2002), Chamley (1986) and Jones
et al. (1993, 1997) conclude that it is generally optimal for the government with an
13The “dynastic”altruism motive suggested by Barro (1974) in which parents care about the well-
being of their o¤spring (thus an individual acts as if it would be in…nitively-living) has been dismissed
on empirical grounds (Wilhelm, 1996; Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotliko¤, 1997). For an important early
contribution on giving with impure altruism, see Andreoni (1989) in which people obtain utility
(“warm glow”) from giving itself.
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intertemporal budget constraint to levy taxes in the initial periods to establish a fund
that can be used to pay steady-state expenditures, allowing often tax rates to converge
to zero in the long run. In an overlapping generations framework, this would imply
sacri…cing the utility of a potentially large number of current and future generations
to bene…t the subsequent generations far away. To avoid the potentially contentious
issue of comparing welfare between di¤erent generations, we adopt the stricter test of
intergenerational Pareto-improvement.
From the positive perspective, we view the idea that a government could tax sev-
eral generations to collect a fund to bene…t subsequent generations rather demanding.
Indeed, in most countries governments have accumulated net debt, rather than even
started creating large funds that would allow them to pay future expenditures without
levying taxes. As a compromise between the normative prediction by the Chamley-
Judd framework and the stylized fact that most governments do not collect such funds,
we assume that the government budget has to be balanced in each period. Naturally,
lifting such restriction would widen the scope for an intertemporal Pareto improvement.
We also adopt a stricter test for the optimality of taxing bequests than in the
optimal tax tradition by assuming …rst that the labor tax rate is not reduced when
introducing bequest taxation. That is, we assume that when the tax revenue exceeds
the government expenditure G after introducing bequest taxation, the excess funds are
paid out lump sum. We also assume that for …nancing G the government has to use
linear taxes on wages and bequests, rather than levying lump-sum taxes. By this, we
follow the tradition by Judd (1985, 2002), Chamley (1986) and Jones et al. (1993,
1997). For simplicity, suppose there are no other taxes.14
14Labor income taxation is the main source of government revenue in all advanced countries, so that
interactions between wage and bequest taxation are the most interesting ones. See, however, section
4 for a discussion of the additional role of education subsidies in our framework.
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3 Equilibrium Analysis
This section analyzes the equilibrium for given tax rates. First, individual decisions are
studied. Second, we examine the evolution of the level of human capital investment and
the level of bequests. Third, and most important, we analyze the impact of bequest
taxation on individual utility. In particular, we ask: Can bequest taxation improve
e¢ciency, i.e., raise welfare of all generations from the time when a bequest tax is
introduced onwards?
3.1 Individual Decisions
The pre-tax bequest received by a member of generation t in her working age (i.e. in
t+1) is denoted by bt+1. ¿w and ¿ b denote the tax rates on wage income and bequest,
respectively. Thus, disposable income of a member of generation t at date t+1 is given
by
It+1 = (1¡ ¿w) ¹wh(et) + (1¡ ¿ b)bt+1 + Tt+1; (5)
where Tt+1 denotes a potential lump-sum transfer. The government budget constraint
in period t+ 1 is
¿w ¹wh(et) + ¿ bbt+1 = ¹G+ Tt+1: (6)
Individual budget constraints at date t+ 1 and t+ 2 are given by
c2;t+1 + st+1 + et+1 = It+1; (7)
c3;t+2 + bt+2 = (1 + ¹r)st+1; (8)
where st+1 denotes working-life savings for retirement. Throughout the paper, we focus
on interior solutions of the utility maximization problem in each period. Using (3)-(8),
it is straightforward to show that a member of generation t in t+1 (with income It+1)
chooses savings for her old age (st+1), educational investment for her child (et+1) in her
9
working age and bequests in retirement age (bt+2) according to …rst-order conditions
u02(c2;t+1)
¯u03(c3;t+2)
= 1 + ¹r; (9)
u02(c2;t+1)
¯v0(It+2)
= (1¡ ¿w) ¹wh0(et+1); (10)
and
u03(c3;t+2)
v0(It+2)
= 1¡ ¿ b; (11)
respectively. Optimality condition (9) is standard: the marginal rate of substitution
between present and future consumption is equal to the interest rate factor. Accord-
ing to (10), the marginal rate of substitution between present consumption and chil-
dren’s income equals the marginal (net) return of children to human capital investment,
whereas (11) says that the marginal rate of substitution between future consumption
and (future) bequests equals the net receiving of children per unit of bequests, 1¡ ¿ b.
For later use, note that parental decisions imply that a member of generation t
receives income
It+1 = ¹wh(et) + bt+1 ¡ ¹G (12)
in t+ 1, according to (5) and (6).15
3.2 Educational Investments
We …rst look at educational investments. By combining (9)-(11) and observing h00(¢) <
0, it is easy to see that the following results hold.
Proposition 1. (Education.) For any t ¸ 1, human capital investment, et ´
e¤(¿ b; ¿w), is time-invariant, unique, and implicitly given by
(1¡ ¿w) ¹wh0(e¤) = (1¡ ¿ b)(1 + ¹r): (13)
15Note that combining (8), (11) and (12) implies u03((1 + ¹r)s0 ¡ b1) = (1 ¡ ¿ b)v0( ¹wh(e0) + b1 ¡ ¹G),
i.e., bequest b1 left by members of the initially old generation is determined by initial conditions:
investment e0 in their o¤spring’s education and savings s0 in their working age.
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Corollary 1. Educational investment e¤ and thus, for all t ¸ 1 equilibrium output,
Yt+1 = h(e¤)f(¹k) ´ Y ¤, are increasing in ¿ b and decreasing in ¿w.
According to Proposition 1, the optimal educational investment, e¤, is reached when
the marginal after-tax return to education equals the after-tax return on one unit of
bequest when invested in the …nancial market. An important implication of this is
that e¤ and thus the gross domestic product, Y ¤, is increasing in the degree of bequest
taxation (Corollary 1). This is because an increase in ¿ b induces parents, who care
about net income of their o¤spring, to substitute away from …nancial transfers (in
retirement age) and invest more in children’s education (in working age). This result
is novel in the literature on bequest taxation. The other result ¡ that higher earnings
taxation (i.e., an increase in ¿w) reduces incentives to invest in education ¡ is standard
and straightforward.
3.3 Bequest Taxation and E¢ciency
We now turn to the question whether bequest taxation can lead to a Pareto-improvement.
In the remainder of this section, we consider the impact on utility of introducing a small
tax on bequests levied from period 2 onwards and announced in period 1. The wage tax
rate ¿w is kept constant throughout this analysis. Note that this is a rather demanding
test for the desirability of a bequest tax as we could alternatively assume that at the
same time the wage tax could be lowered when marginally increasing ¿ b. We …nd (as
proven, like all subsequent formal results, in the appendix)
Lemma 1. By levying a small bequest tax from period 2 onwards, (i) the currently
middle-aged generation unambiguously gains (is una¤ected) if ¿w > (=)0, and (ii) a
Pareto-improvement occurs if and only if
1 + ¹r + ¿w
1¡ ¿w
@e¤
@¿ b
¯¯¯¯
¿ b=0
+
@bt+1
@¿ b
¯¯¯¯
¿ b=0
¸ 0 (14)
for t ¸ 1.16
16Note that evaluating at ¿b = 0 means that no revenue is generated from bequest taxation.
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For the initially middle-aged generation, income (I1) is not a¤ected by the bequest
tax from period 2 onwards. (Consequently, also utility of the initially old generation is
una¤ected.) The increase in utility of members of the initially middle-aged generation
(when ¿w > 0), stated in part (i) of Lemma 1, is due to the positive impact of an
introduction of a small bequest tax ¿ b on human capital investment (Corollary 1), which
positively a¤ects their o¤spring’s income. Regarding the generations born after the
initially middle-aged, two potentially counteracting e¤ects are relevant. The …rst one is
again the unambiguously positive impact of ¿ b on e¤(¿ b; ¿w), according to Corollary 1.
However, the e¤ect on welfare also depends on how the bequests received from parents
are a¤ected. Thus, if the amount of intergenerational transfers declines, utility may
decline after introducing bequest taxation despite the positive e¤ect from an increase
in human capital investments. Hence, a priori, it is not clear whether bequest taxes
can improve e¢ciency. The positive impact of bequest taxation on human capital
formation has to be weighted against the potential reduction in bequests.
When the optimal bequest tax is positive, its intuition can be summarized as fol-
lows. In absence of a bequest tax, a positive tax on labor distorts the composition
of intergenerational transfers in favor of bequests. Thus, parents will invest too little
in their children’s education. To reduce this …rst-order distortion in educational in-
vestment, the government may levy a bequest tax.17 Starting from a zero tax rate on
…nancial bequests, introducing a bequest tax generates only a second-order distortion
in the level of bequests, at the same time as it alleviates the …rst-order distortion in the
composition of intergenerational transfers. Hence, a positive tax on bequests would be
optimal.
As general conclusions are di¢cult to obtain, we attempt to gain insight into this
issue from an example which allows explicit analytical solutions. From now on we
17Note that we do not allow for positive externalities of human capital formation (which could
generate endogenous growth). Rather, the only distortion of educational investments comes from wage
taxation. Assuming instead that positive externalities from education exist would make a positive tax
on bequests even more desirable.
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consider utility speci…cations
u2(c) = u3(c) = ln c and v(I) = ln(I ¡ Â); (15)
where Â > 0 may be interpreted as “subsistence income”of children from the perspec-
tive of parents. It is a measure of the strength of the bequest motive. To simplify
further, let us also employ the standard speci…cation
¯(1 + ¹r) = 1: (16)
Moreover, let us de…ne
¡¤(¿ b; ¿w) ´ (1 + ¯)Â ¡ (¯ + ¿ b)
¡
¹wh(e¤(¿ b; ¿w))¡ ¹G
¢ ¡ (1¡ ¿ b)e¤(¿ b; ¿w); (17)
¡0(¿ b; ¿w) ´ (1+¯)Â+(¯+¿ b) ¹G¡(1+¯) ¹wh(e¤(¿ b; ¿w))+(1¡¿ b) [ ¹wh(e0)¡ e¤(¿ b; ¿w)] :
(18)
Note that both expressions are positive if Â is su¢ciently large, which is presumed for
the next result.
Lemma 2. Under speci…cations (15) and (16), if ¡¤ > 0 and ¡0 > 0, then the
evolution of bequests is characterized by
b2 =
¡0(¿ b; ¿w)
1 + ¯ + ¯(1¡ ¿ b) + c(¿ b)b1 ´ B0(b1; ¿ b; ¿w) (19)
and, for t ¸ 1,
bt+2 =
¡¤(¿ b; ¿w)
1 + ¯ + ¯(1¡ ¿ b) + c(¿ b)bt+1 ´ B
¤(bt+1; ¿ b; ¿w); (20)
where
c(¿ b) ´ 1¡ ¿ b
1 + ¯ + ¯(1¡ ¿ b) < 1: (21)
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Thus, intergenerational transfers converge to steady state level
b¤(¿ b; ¿w) ´ ¡
¤(¿ b; ¿w)
2¯ + ¿ b(1¡ ¯) > 0: (22)
The presumptions in Lemma 2 thus imply that a unique and stable steady state
with a positive amount of bequest exists. In order to examine the dynamic process and
the welfare implications of introducing a bequest tax, we suppose that the economy is
initially in a steady state with no bequest taxation (¿ b = 0). That is, de…ning revenue
from wage income taxation as Rw(¿ b; ¿w) ´ ¿w ¹wh(e¤(¿ b; ¿w), we set the wage tax rate
at ¿w = ¿0w as given by Rw(0; ¿
0
w) = ¹G; moreover, initial conditions e0 = e
¤(0; ¿ 0w)
and b1 = b¤(0; ¿ 0w). The next result implies that to establish a Pareto-improvement
we only need to check whether the introduction of a bequest tax in t = 1 bene…ts the
initially young generation (i.e., raises U1) and the steady state generation (i.e., raises
Ut as t ! 1).
Lemma 3. Suppose e0 = e¤(0; ¿ 0w) and b1 = b¤(0; ¿ 0w). Under the presumptions of
Lemma 2, announcing in period t = 1 that a small tax is levied on bequests from period
2 onwards raises e¢ciency if condition (14) holds for both t = 1 and t ! 1.
<Figure 1>
Recall from Lemma 1 that a Pareto-improvement is obtained when the amount of
bequest is not reduced too much in response to the introduction of the bequest tax
from period 2 onwards. Fig. 1 shows the evolution of bequests after introduction of
the bequest tax. Let b^ be the level of bequest such that, when starting at b^ in period
1, bequests immediately jump to the steady state level b¤ in period 2. If b1 < b^, the
amount of bequests increases over time from period 2 onwards. Thus, if the generation
which is middle-aged when the bequest tax is introduced does not reduce bequests b2
too much, so that generation 1 is made better o¤, all generations are made better o¤.
That is, if condition (14) holds for t = 1, it holds for all t > 1 as well. In contrast, if
b1 > b^, bequests decrease over time from period 2 onwards, eventually reaching steady
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state value b¤ (point A in Fig. 1). Thus, if b¤ is not reduced too much by the bequest
tax, also bequests during the transition to the steady state will decline su¢ciently little
so to leave every generation better o¤.
To obtain explicit characterizations in what follows, we further specify
h(e) = e1=2. (23)
Then (13) and (16) imply that
e¤(¿ b; ¿w) =
1
4
·
¯(1¡ ¿w) ¹w
1¡ ¿ b
¸2
: (24)
Lemma 4. Under speci…cations (15), (16) and (23).
(i) @Rw=@¿w > (=; <)0 if and only if ¿w < (=; >)0:5.
(ii) b¤(0; ¿ 0w) > 0 if and only if e
¤(0; ¿ 0w) < (1 + ¯)Â=3 ´ ¹e(¯; Â).
(iii) For both t = 1 and t ! 1, @bt+1=@¿ bj¿b=0 < 0.
Part (i) of Lemma 4 shows that a La¤er e¤ect with respect to labor income tax-
ation does not occur if tax rate ¿w is su¢ciently small. Part (ii) of Lemma 4 implies
that steady state bequests in absence of bequest taxation, b¤(0; ¿ 0w) are positive if the
bequest motive, measured by Â, is su¢ciently strong. Finally, part (iii) implies that
intergenerational transfers decline in all periods after introduction of a small bequest
tax.
We are now ready to study under which circumstances the introduction of a bequest
tax, despite its negative e¤ect on the level of bequests, raises e¢ciency.
Proposition 2. Suppose e0 = e¤(0; ¿ 0w) < ¹e(¯; Â) and b1 = b¤(0; ¿ 0w). Under
speci…cations (15), (16) and (23), levying a small bequest tax improves welfare of each
generation if ¿ 0w > ¹¿w(¯) and e0 ¸ e(¿ 0w; ¯; Â), where
¹¿w(¯) ´ 2¡ ¯
2 + ¯(4¯ + 1)
; (25)
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with ¹¿w(¯) 2 (0; 1), and
e(¿ 0w; ¯; Â) ´
(1¡ ¿ 0w)(1¡ ¯)(1 + ¯)Â
¿ 0w
¡
1 + 5¯ + 8¯2
¢ ¡ 1¡ ¯ ; (26)
with e(¿0w; ¯; Â) 2 (0; ¹e(¯; Â)).
According to Proposition 2, if the initial wage tax rate is su¢ciently high (¿ 0w >
¹¿w(¯)), i.e., the human capital investment decision is severely distorted by labor in-
come taxation, a bequest tax may be e¢ciency-enhancing even if not used to lower the
wage tax. (For instance, if ¯ = 0:9, as used in the numerical analysis of the optimal
tax structure in the next section, we have ¹¿w(¯) ¼ 0:18.) In this case, the incen-
tive to raise educational investment may dominate the e¤ect from a reduction in the
amount of bequests on utility. Under the speci…cations of functional forms considered
in Proposition 2, e¢ciency and welfare are indeed raised if, in addition to ¿ 0w > ¹¿w(¯),
incentives to invest in education (and thus e0 = e¤(0; ¿ 0w)) are su¢ciently high
18 (but
low enough to induce positive bequests in the initial steady state; see Lemma 4 (ii)).
4 Optimal Tax Structure
In the previous section, we proved that introducing a small bequest tax may raise
e¢ciency, even if the wage tax rate is kept constant. In this section, we analyze
what would be an optimally chosen combination of wage and bequest taxation, with
a given government revenue requirement. To abstract from transition issues, we focus
on maximizing the utility of steady-state generations,19 assuming that the government
budget is balanced in each period.
According to (3), (4), (12), (7) and (8), the social planner’s optimization problem
18This is ensured if the wage rate ¹w is su¢ciently high, i.e., the economy is technologically advanced.
To see this, recall e¤(0; ¿w) = [¯(1 ¡ ¿w) ¹w]2 =4 and note that e as given in (26) is independent of ¹w.
19As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, introducing a small bequest tax leads to a Pareto improve-
ment if it bene…ts the steady state generation. This suggests that all generations are made better o¤
under the optimal tax mix for steady state generations, compared to a situation where there is only
wage taxation.
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is then given by
max
¿b;¿w
©
u2( ¹wh(e
¤) + b¤ ¡ ¹G ¡ s¤ ¡ e¤) + ¯u3((1 + ¹r)s¤ ¡ b¤) + ¯v( ¹wh(e¤) + b¤ ¡ ¹G)
ª
(27)
s.t. ¿w ¹wh(e¤) + ¿ bb¤ = ¹G: (28)
Tab. 1 shows numerical results for the optimal tax rates, denoted ¿ optw , ¿
opt
b , for di¤erent
government expenditures with an assumption that ¹w = 1 and ¯ = 0:9, for varying levels
of Â and ¹G.
Â ¹G ¿ 0w ¿
opt
w ¿
opt
b
b¤(0;¿0w)
¹wh(e¤(0;¿0w))
b¤(¿optb ;¿
opt
w )
¹wh(e¤(¿optb ;¿
opt
w ))
0.4 0 0 0.048 -0.112 0.188 0.423
0.4 0.02 0.047 0.079 -0.065 0.269 0.416
0.4 0.04 0.099 0.109 -0.019 0.365 0.412
0.4 0.06 0.158 0.140 0.027 0.484 0.409
0.4 0.08 0.231 0.170 0.071 0.644 0.408
0.4 0.10 0.333 0.199 0.115 0.907 0.409
0.5 0 0 0.056 -0.084 0.423 0.660
0.5 0.02 0.047 0.081 -0.046 0.515 0.656
0.5 0.04 0.099 0.106 -0.008 0.625 0.653
0.5 0.06 0.158 0.130 0.029 0.762 0.652
0.5 0.08 0.231 0.154 0.065 0.949 0.652
0.5 0.10 0.333 0.178 0.100 1.259 0.654
Table 1. Optimal tax rates.
Our numerical results suggest certain general patterns. First of all, the optimal
bequest tax rate is generally positive when government revenue requirement, ¹G, is
su¢ciently high. This is consistent with the intuition of Proposition 2: Using bequest
taxes can raise e¢ciency when an excessive use of a wage tax would be too distorting.
With a low revenue requirement, however, it is optimal to moderately tax wages and use
tax revenue to subsidize bequests. Moreover, also when ¹G is high, the optimal bequest
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tax rate is signi…cantly lower than the wage tax rate. The intuition for these results is
the following. Investment in human capital exhibits decreasing returns to scale, while
…nancial markets provide constant returns to scale. At the same time as taxing wages
reduces investment in human capital, it also increases the rate of return to marginal
investment. This partly counteracts the distortion created by the tax wedge. When the
government chooses tax rates to balance marginal distortions from collecting any given
revenue, it is optimal to distort human capital investment relatively more. For the
same reason, when ¹G is low, taxing the return to education and subsidizing bequests
may improve the welfare of the steady-state generations by encouraging parents to
transfer in aggregate more resources to their children. Also note that optimal tax
rates are non-zero even in the case where ¹G = 0. Why an optimal tax on bequests
could be negative (and therefore the optimal wage tax positive) even when there is
no public sector? The answer relies on the positive intergenerational externalities that
intergenerational transfers generate. Each generation chooses the level of transfers to
the subsequent generation taking into account only its own joy-of-children-receiving.
Subsidizing …nancial bequests encourages more giving, thus partly internalizing the
existing positive externality, while taxing wages introduces a negative distortion. A
priori, there is no reason why the social planner should abstain doing the former in
order to avoid the latter, given that returns to education are diminishing.
Second, an increase in public expenditures ¹G results in an increase in both tax rates
¿optb and ¿
opt
w as well as in the ratio between the bequest tax rate and the wage tax
rate, ¿optb =¿
opt
w (that is, optimal bequest tax rate increases faster than the optimal wage
tax rate). With a zero revenue requirement, this ratio is negative, then increasing and
approaching unity as ¹G increases.
In the last two columns of Tab. 1, we also report the size of bequests relative to
the wage income that children receive over their working period, both in the initial
situation (without bequest tax) and under the optimal tax mix. The relative size
of bequests is increasing in the strength of parents’motive to transfer resources to
their children, measured by parameter Â. (Recall that b¤ is increasing in Â, whereas
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e¤ is independent of Â.) In the absence of bequest taxation, increasing the wage tax
rate results in parents transferring relatively more resources through bequests. In the
examples we report, in the absence of bequest taxes, the size of bequests varies between
19 and 91 percent of the lifetime wage income with Â = 0:4, and between 42 and 126
percent with Â = 0:5. When the bequest tax rate is set optimally, the range is 41 to 42
percent with Â = 0:4 and 65 to 66 percent with Â = 0:5. This suggests that optimal
taxation stabilizes the composition of intergenerational transfers when the general level
of public expenditures changes.
So far, we have abstracted from the instrument of education subsidies for stim-
ulating educational investment. Partly, this may be justi…ed because human capital
investments are often unobservable to tax authorities, in a similar manner as the op-
timal tax literature typically posits that work e¤ort is not observable.20 Nevertheless,
one may ask if the potentially bene…cial role of using bequest taxes suggested by our
preceding analysis still holds when education subsidies are feasible. For this purpose,
suppose each unit of investment in education, e, is subsidized by a constant rate ¿e. A
numerical analysis of this extended model with optimally chosen education subsidies,
focusing again on the steady state, suggests that education should indeed be subsidized,
at a rate of similar magnitude as the optimal wage tax rate (results not shown).21 Im-
portantly, however, the main insight from Tab. 1, that bequests should be subsidized
with a low government requirement ¹G and taxed for a high level of ¹G, is una¤ected.
Thus, the qualitative results on the optimality of taxing bequests with a large public
sector hold even when education subsidies are available.
20Trostel (1993) estimates that about a quarter of the costs of education are non-veri…able, even
when abstracting from any e¤ort costs. In their paper on human capital investment and capital income
taxation, Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005) …nd that taxing capital income is optimal with subsidies to
human capital investment when at least a share of these investments is non-veri…able.
21Numerical results are provided in supplementary material which is available from the authors
upon request.
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5 Conclusion
Altruistic parents may transfer resources to their o¤spring by providing education and
by leaving bequests. Parental altruism is often seen as an argument against bequest
taxation, the reason being that bequest taxation would distort the accumulation of
capital intergenerationally in the same way as capital income taxation would distort
consumption pro…le and savings over the individual life cycle. In this paper we show
that this intuition needs no longer hold true in the presence of education and wage
taxation. Wage taxes reduce the rate of return that children receive on parental in-
vestments in education. This induces parents, who value the after-tax resources that
their children receive, to reduce investment in education, and leave bequests instead.
We show that a small bequest tax may improve e¢ciency in an overlapping-generations
framework with only intended bequests, even when the labor income tax remains un-
changed. This is because the bequest tax may mitigate the distortion of educational
investment caused by wage taxation.
In addition to deriving a general criterion for the desirability of a small bequest tax
when the wage tax rate is left unchanged, we also analyze what would be an optimal mix
of wage taxes and bequest taxes with given government revenue requirement. Certain
clear patterns emerge. First of all, the optimal bequest tax is generally positive when
the government revenue requirement is su¢ciently high, although always lower than
the wage tax rate. Moreover, our analysis suggests that, when the government revenue
requirement increases, the ratio between the bequest tax and the wage tax should
increase.
Our results have certain surprising implications for the U.S. debate on estate taxa-
tion. Currently, descendants of only 2 percent of Americans who die pay estate taxes.
Even proponents of the estate tax are willing to raise the exempted amount further.
We …nd that this policy, while popular, need not be optimal. It might well be optimal
to tax also smaller bequest, possibly at a relatively low rate, and use the tax revenue to
lower wage taxes. Such policy would boost the incentives of altruistic parents among
the currently exempted 98 percent of population to transfer resources to their children
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more through education. Taken seriously, such policy advice would suggest, paraphras-
ing Mark Twain, that the rumors of the imminent demise of the death tax are greatly
exaggerated.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Part (i) is proven …rst. Note that the currently middle-aged
generation is born in t = 0. Also note from (12) that their income, I1, is initially given,
as e0 and b1 (the latter depending on both e0 and s0) are given. Observing e1 = e¤, we
have
U0 = u2(I1 ¡ s1 ¡ e¤) + ¯u3((1 + ¹r)s1 ¡ b2) + ¯v( ¹wh(e¤) + b2 ¡ ¹G); (A.1)
according to (3), (4), (12), (7) and (8). Di¤erentiating with respect to ¿ b, using (by ap-
plying the envelope theorem) both u02(c2;1) = (1+¹r)¯u
0
3(c3;2) and v
0(I2) = u03(c3;2)=(1¡
¿ b), according to (9) and (11), and, …nally, using ¹wh0(e¤)=(1¡ ¿ b) = (1 + ¹r)=(1¡ ¿w),
according to (13), leads to
@U0
@¿ b
= ¯u03(c3;2)
·
(1 + ¹r)
¿w
1¡ ¿w
@e¤
@¿ b
+
¿ b
1¡ ¿ b
@b2
@¿ b
¸
: (A.2)
Thus, @U0=@¿ bj¿b=0 > (=)0 if ¿w > (=)0, according to Corollary 1. This con…rms part
(i).
We now turn to part (ii). Utility of generation t ¸ 1 is
Ut = u2( ¹wh(et)+bt+1¡ ¹G¡st+1¡et+1)+¯u3((1+¹r)st+1¡bt+2)+¯v( ¹wh(et+1)+bt+2¡ ¹G):
(A.3)
Taking into account that et+1 = e¤ for all t ¸ 0 stays the same, di¤erentiating and
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using …rst-order condition (10) w.r.t. st+1 gives
@Ut
@¿ b
= u02 ¹wh
0 @e
¤
@¿ b
+ u02
@bt+1
@¿ b
¡ u02
@e¤
@¿ b
¡ ¯u03
@bt+2
@¿ b
+ ¯v0 ¹wh0
@e¤
@¿ b
+ ¯v0
@bt+2
@¿ b
: (A.4)
As before, this simpli…es as
@Ut
@¿ b
= (1 + ¹r)¯u03 ¹wh
0@e
¤
@¿ b
+ (1 + ¹r)¯u03
@bt+1
@¿ b
¡ (1 + ¹r)¯u03
@e¤
@¿ b
¡¯u03
@bt+2
@¿ b
+ ¯
u03
1¡ ¿ b ¹wh
0 @e
¤
@¿ b
+ ¯
u03
1¡ ¿ b
@bt+2
@¿ b
: (A.5)
We obtain condition (14) by using (13), factoring out ¯u03(1 + ¹r) and evaluating at
¿ b = 0. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2. Substituting c2;t+1 = It+1 ¡ st+1 ¡ et+1 and c3;t+2 = (1 +
¹r)st+1 ¡ bt+2 from (7) and (8), respectively, into (9), and using u2(c) = u3(c) = ln c,
leads to
st+1 =
¯(1 + ¹r) (It+1 ¡ et+1) + bt+2
(1 + ¹r)(1 + ¯)
(A.6)
for all t ¸ 0. Moreover, substituting c3;t+2 = (1 + ¹r)st+1 ¡ bt+2 from (8) into (11), and
using u3(c) = ln c and v(I) = ln(I ¡ Â) yields It+2 ¡ Â = (1 ¡ ¿ b) [(1 + ¹r)st+1 ¡ bt+2].
Substituting (12) and (A.6) into this expression and using both et+1 = e¤ for t ¸ 0 and
¯(1+¹r) = 1 from speci…cation (16) implies that bequests evolve over time according to
(19) and (20). As c(¿ b) < 1, the dynamic process governing the evolution of bequests
is stable. Finally, setting bt+1 = bt+2 ´ b¤ in (20), observing (21) and solving for b¤
gives us (22). This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Lemma 3. If ¿ b > 0, then e0 < e¤(¿ b; ¿0w), according to Corollary 1.
Consequently, we have ¡0(¿ b; ¿w) < ¡¤(¿ b; ¿w), according to (17) and (18), and thus,
B0(b; ¢) < B¤(b; ¢), according to (19) and (20). Fig. 1 depicts b2 = B0(b1; ¢) as dashed
line and bt+2 = B¤(bt+1; ¢) as solid line for ¿ b > 0. The steady state level of bequest
with ¿ b > 0, b¤, is given by point A. Let b^ be given by B0(b^; ¢) = b¤. Now if b1 < b^ as
in Fig. 1, then b2 < b¤ and, for all t ¸ 1, bt+2 increases over time to b¤. In this case, if
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condition (14) holds for t = 1, it also holds for all t > 1. If b1 = b^, then b2 = bt+2 = b¤
for all t ¸ 1. Finally, if b1 > b^, then b2 > b¤ and, for all t ¸ 1, bt+2 decreases over time
to b¤. In this case, if condition (14) holds for t ! 1 (i.e., for bt+1 = b¤), it also holds
for all t ¸ 1. This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Lemma 4. Part (i) is con…rmed by substituting (24) into Rw =
¿w ¹w (e¤)
1=2. To prove part (ii), note that
b¤(0; ¿0w) =
(1 + ¯)Â ¡ ¯(1¡ ¿ 0w) ¹wh(e¤(0; ¿ 0w))¡ e¤(0; ¿ 0w)
2¯
; (A.7)
according to (17), (22) and (by de…nition of ¿0w) ¹wh(e
¤(0; ¿ 0w))¡ ¹G = (1¡¿ 0w) ¹wh(e¤(0; ¿ 0w)).
Using h(e) = e1=2 and substituting e¤(0; ¿w) = [¯(1¡ ¿w) ¹w]2 =4 from (24) into (A.7)
leads to
b¤(0; ¿ 0w) =
(1 + ¯)Â ¡ 3e¤(0; ¿0w)
2¯
(A.8)
which con…rms part (ii). Regarding part (iii), take partial derivatives of (22) and (19)
with respect to ¿ b, by using (17) and (18), respectively. By evaluating the resulting
expressions at (¿ b; ¿w) = (0; ¿ 0w) and noting that
@e¤(¿ b; ¿w)
@¿ b
¯¯¯¯
¿b=0
= 2e¤(0; ¿w); (A.9)
according to (24), we obtain
@b¤(¿ b; ¿0w)
@¿ b
¯¯¯¯
¿ b=0
= ¡
(1¡ ¿ 0w) ¹wh(e¤(0; ¿ 0w)) +
³
22¡¿
0
w
1¡¿0w ¡ 1
´
e¤(0; ¿0w) + (1¡ ¯)b¤(0; ¿ 0w)
2¯
(A.10)
and
@B0(b1; ¿ b; ¿ 0w)
@¿ b
¯¯¯¯
¿ b=0
= ¡
(1¡ ¿ 0w) ¹wh(e¤(0; ¿ 0w)) +
³
21+¯(2¡¿
0
w)
¯(1¡¿0w) ¡ 1
´
e¤(0; ¿0w) + (1¡ ¯)b1
1 + 2¯
:
(A.11)
Both derivatives are negative. This concludes the proof. ¥
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Proof of Proposition 2.22 First, note that e0 < ¹e(¯; Â) implies b1 > 0, according
to part (ii) of Lemma 4. According to Lemma 3 and the presumptions of Proposition
2, a Pareto-improvement is reached if
?¤ ´
1
¯
+ ¿0w
1¡ ¿0w
@e¤(¿ b; ¿0w)
@¿ b
¯¯¯¯
¿ b=0
+
@b¤(¿ b; ¿ 0w)
@¿ b
¯¯¯¯
¿b=0
¸ 0 (A.12)
and
?0 ´
1
¯
+ ¿ 0w
1¡ ¿ 0w
@e¤(¿ b; ¿ 0w)
@¿ b
¯¯¯¯
¿b=0
+
@B0(b
¤(0; ¿ 0w); ¿ b; ¿
0
w)
@¿ b
¯¯¯¯
¿ b=0
¸ 0 (A.13)
simultaneously hold.
We begin to check (A.12). It is tedious but straightforward to show that substituting
(A.9) and (A.10) into (A.12) and using (A.8) implies
?¤ =
1 + ¯
4¯2
µ
e0
1¡ ¿ 0w
·
(1 + 5¯ + 8¯2)¿ 0w
1 + ¯
¡ 1
¸
¡ (1¡ ¯)Â
¶
: (A.14)
Thus, ?¤ ¸ 0 if and only if
¿ 0w >
1 + ¯
1 + 5¯ + 8¯2
´ q¤(¯): (A.15)
and e0 ¸ e(¿0w; ¯; Â) simultaneously hold, using the de…nition of e in (26). One can
show that e(¿ 0w; ¯; Â) < ¹e(¯;Â) if and only if ¿
0
w > ¹¿w(¯). Moreover, ¹¿w(¯) > q
¤(¯).
Thus, ¿ 0w > ¹¿w(¯) implies ¿
0
w > q
¤(¯). From (25), it is also easy to see that ¹¿w(¯) < 1.
Now we turn to derive an expression for ?0. It is again tedious but straightforward
to show that substituting (A.9) and (A.11) into (A.13) and using b1 = b¤(0; ¿ 0w) as
given in (A.8) implies
?0 =
1 + ¯
2¯(1 + 2¯)
µ
e0
1¡ ¿ 0w
£
(1 + 8¯)¿ 0w ¡ 1
¤ ¡ (1¡ ¯)Â¶ ; (A.16)
22A more detailed proof is presented in a technical appendix, available from the authors upon
request.
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Thus, (A.13) is ful…lled if and only if
¿ 0w >
1
1 + 8¯
´ q0(¯) (A.17)
and
e0 ¸ (1¡ ¯)Â(1¡ ¿
0
w)
(1 + 8¯)¿ 0w ¡ 1
´ e(¿ 0w; ¯; Â) (A.18)
simultaneously hold. One can show that ¿0w > ¹¿w(¯) implies ¿
0
w > q0(¯). Moreover, it
is straightforward to check that e(¿ 0w; ¯; Â) > e(¿
0
w; ¯; Â), according to (26) and (A.18).
Thus, if ?¤ ¸ 0, then ?0 > 0. This concludes the proof. ¥
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Figure 1: The evolution of bequests, illustrated for the case bbb ˆ1
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